This frame grab of footage aired Wednesday, July 1, 2026, by Iranian state television shows a vessel that ran aground in the Strait of Hormuz. (Iranian state television via AP) For some, the use of economic warfare can be valid because the ends will justify the means. For others, it is inherently immoral and unjustifiable. The reality is that it is more nuanced.
It can rationally be argued that short-term pain for long-term gain is a valid strategy, particularly as it relates to freeing civilians from a repressive regime. But if no strategic objectives are accomplished, the only result will be increased suffering for these same people.
With a renewed blockade of Iran looming on the horizon, it is becoming increasingly fantastical to argue that another round of economic warfare would accomplish anything beyond inflicting even greater suffering on the Iranian people we claim to want to help.
The tools of economic warfare are justifiable only if there is a realistic expectation that they can produce the strategic outcomes they are employed to achieve. There must be a favorable risk-reward proposition. A pipe dream is not a valid strategy when the downside risk is a severe humanitarian crisis.
With President Trump announcing a renewed blockade of Iran, and with the previous memorandum of understanding in tatters, everything now points towards even more aggressive economic warfare campaign than we saw the first time around — think of it as Operation Economic Fury 2.0.
But a critical question still needs to be answered by those advocating it: Why would we possibly expect this to succeed now?
When the U.S. first implemented the blockade of Iran in mid-April, the Trump administration attached itself to a short-term time horizon. Thirteen days until Iran runs out of oil storage, it has been forced to shut in its oil wells lest, as Trump so eloquently put it, Iran’s oil infrastructure should “explode” — although clearly, that did not happen.
It is not impossible that economic pain from a renewed economic pressure campaign could produce capitulation from the Iranian regime or public unrest, but there is a major gulf between the possible and the likely. A mere possibility is not enough to justify the downside risks.
The burden of proof is now dramatically higher than it was in April to show that a reimposed blockade would produce notable outcomes. If the supporters of a renewed Operation Economic Fury 2.0 believe it will now produce a significantly different outcome, they must first explain what has changed in the strategic landscape since the memorandum of understanding was signed, and the dueling blockades were lifted.
Trump himself has acknowledged, more than three weeks ago, that time is not on Washington’s side. Since then, Iran has not only remained in its advantageous position, but it has actually strengthened it.
After the U.S. blockade was lifted, Iran exported more than 80 million barrels of oil that were previously trapped. It has replenished essential goods, including wheat, medical supplies, cooking oil and protein. In the meantime, the global economy has failed to move normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
The U.S. is no longer facing the same adversary it faced in March, nor the same as when the blockade was first imposed. It is facing an Iran that proved it can survive a maximum-pressure campaign.
Yet the survival of the Iranian regime, while a clear failure for the U.S., is not inherently a total victory for Iran. Inflation sits at 88 percent year-over-year. The rial is in free-fall. Unemployment inside of Iran is skyrocketing. None of this is new for Iranians, but economic hardship has never been enough to topple the regime. And if economic hardship at this scale has still failed to produce regime collapse or major concessions, there is little reason to believe that simply imposing more of it will suddenly change the outcome.
That is the fundamental problem with reimposition of the blockade. The actual likelihood of achieving Washington’s strategic objectives is lower now than it was in April, even though the risk of a humanitarian crisis is higher.
Many of the proponents of the Iran War argued that it was necessary to finally free the Iranian people from an oppressive regime — to improve their lives, not make them worse. When Trump launched Economic Fury, there was at least a credible belief that it could produce a positive outcome.
But we have seen this movie. Nothing in the current strategic landscape suggests that there is a reason to believe this sequel ends differently. Iran is stronger than it was when the first blockade ended, and the Iranian people are materially weaker.
The proponents of a renewed pressure campaign need to prove that there is a high enough probability of success to justify causing an even deeper humanitarian crisis against an Iran that is now better positioned than ever to withstand it. Frankly, there is no reason to believe it does.
The new blockade of Iran would not erase the failure of the first campaign. It would repeat it under even less favorable conditions, at an even greater humanitarian cost, directly harming the very people Washington claims it wants to help.
Brett Erickson is managing principal at Obsidian Risk Advisors and an advisory board member for Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and International Relations and DePaul University Driehaus College of Business.
Add as preferred source on Google Tags Bretton Woods institutions Donald Trump Economy of Iran inflation Iran Iran war memorandum of understanding operation epic fury President Trump Strait of Hormuz blockade The global economy The Iranian people The Trump administration The United States Trump administration US blockade US-Iran MOU US-Iran warCopyright 2026 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Comments: Link copiedMore Opinions - National Security News
See All
Opinions - National Security Trump is America’s biggest national security threat by William S. Becker, opinion contributor 2 days ago Opinions - National Security / 2 days ago 
